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DIGITAL DOMINION: HOW THE SYRIAN REGIME’S MASS DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE VIOLATES HUMAN
RIGHTS

I.

Introduction

“Privacy is not an option, and it shouldn’t be the price we accept for just getting on the Internet.” – Gary Kovacs1
The Assad regime conducts mass electronic and digital monitoring of its people. Anyone who dares to voice
opposition or fails to proclaim their loyalty is deemed dangerous and quickly falls under suspicion. The privacy,
freedom of expression, and the life and safety of millions has been imperiled by a government desperate to
control the narrative. A sprawling infrastructure of surveillance, from control of Internet Service Providers (ISP),
mobile service providers to aggressive hacking and tracking operations, has facilitated the monitoring, detention,
and persecution of critics, journalists, and human rights defenders. This report exposes the monitoring carried
out by the Syrian government in order to contribute to accountability for human rights violations and to promote
the protection of the right to privacy, so essential for the realization of other rights.
The Assad regime has been able to conduct mass surveillance, in part, because it exercises complete control
over the country’s internet activity through the government controlled and regulated telecommunication
infrastructure. The state-owned Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (“STE”) is both an internet service
provider (ISP) and the official telecommunications regulator. In 2007, the STE solicited bids for a Central
Monitoring System with the “the ability to monitor all the networks which use data communication services inside
the Syrian territories.”2 The resulting infrastructure provided the government power to monitor all traffic and to
stockpile data for identifying and targeting individuals critical of the regime. 3 Since then, the Assad regime has
continued to strengthen this invasive infrastructure by adding content filtering systems to combat political speech,
cutting or “blacking out” internet access and service during the uprising and protests, blocking websites critical
of or exposing corruption within the Assad regime, as well as temporarily blocking popular websites and online
services such as YouTube, Facebook, and Skype. 4
In conjunction with actively monitoring their own citizens, the Syrian regime, together with third party groups, is
hacking websites and individuals critical of the regime. A group that calls themselves the Syrian Electronic Army
(“SEA”) is one such state-sanctioned hacking group that targets major news organizations and NGOs as well as
local opposition groups and individual activists.5 Through “phishing” operations, social engineering, malware
downloads, and gaining access to passwords and networks through security force intimidation, the SEA and the
Assad regime have used these practices to monitor and track down activists and human rights defenders in
Syria, who are then tortured and killed. Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s president, has publicly recognized the SEA and
the support it has provided the regime by surveilling their dissenters and others who oppose the Syrian regime.6

1 See, Gary Kovacs, Tracking Our Online Trackers, TED2012 (Feb. 2012), available at:
https://www.ted.com/talks/gary_kovacs_tracking_our_online_trackers/transcript?language=en
2 Open Season: Building Syria’s Surveillance State, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, (Dec. 2016), available at:
https://privacyinternational.org/report/1016/open-season-building-syrias-surveillance-state.
3 See, e.g., Zack Whittaker, Surveillance and Censorship: Inside Syria’s Internet, CBS (Dec. 12, 2013), available at:
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/surveillance-and-censorship-inside-syrias-internet/ (“[e]very single piece of traffic that goes through
[the Syrian network] is being recorded to hard disk drives.”).
4 Freedom on the Net: Syria 2019, FREEDOM HOUSE, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/syria/freedom-net/2019.
5 Max Fisher, Syrian Hackers Claim AP Hack that Tipped Stock Market by $136 Billion. Is it Terrorism?, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/04/23/syrian-hackers-claim-ap-hack-that-tipped-stock-market-by-136billion-is-it-terrorism/?utm_term=.e4be4274574a.
6 Danny O’Brien, Syria’s Assad Gives Tacit OK to Online Attacks on Press, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Jun. 24, 2011),
available at: https://cpj.org/blog/2011/06/syrias-assad-gives-tacit-ok-to-online-attacks-on-p/ (recounting a speech in which Bashar alAssad referenced the SEA).
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This report details how the Syrian regime proactively monitors dissenters, either directly or through non-state
actors, and how that digital monitoring facilitates the broader campaign of control and violence leading to arrests,
torture, forced disappearances, and death of Syrian people. The report begins, in Section II, by providing the
background on the infrastructure of surveillance and key state and state-sanctioned actors involved in
surveillance activities. Next, Section III outlines the human rights implicated and being violated by the states
campaign of mass surveillance and violence. Finally, Section IV identifies the direct violation of the rights of
Syrian people and human rights defenders that result from this surveillance. An enabling legal and institutional
infrastructure has facilitated both the mass surveillance and the accompanying violence carried out by the
regime. As a result, human rights defenders, critics, and journalists, have been censored, monitored, hacked
and tracked. This targeting has facilitated the detention, torture and extrajudicial killings of countless individuals.
The purpose of the report is to document the systematic use of surveillance by the Syrian regime, the human
rights violations suffered by those who have been surveilled, and to call upon the international community to
seek accountability in Syria.
This Report seeks to shed light on the legal, political, and technological context in which surveillance is used to
violate human rights. In doing so, advocates and the global community must push forward reforms to limit the
use of surveillance to monitor and punish human rights activists. The analysis in this report provides a framework
which journalists and others documenting the violence and human rights crisis in Syria may use to continue
reporting on the regime’s use of surveillance of the Syrian people. Finally, by documenting the current situation
in Syria, this report hopes to inform broader conversations on state-sponsored surveillance and how it endangers
activists and others who speak up against governments and powerful actors. The Assad regime’s use of
surveillance as a critical tool to intimidate and eliminate opposition must serve as a warning to the global
community of the dangerous effects of the unchecked and broad powers of surveillance to silence and eliminate
opposition. Countless critics, journalists, students, and others have been surveilled and persecuted for exercising
their human rights to expression and association. This report is only the beginning of this broader conversation
about the need to press for limitations in the use of surveillance and to hold the Syrian State accountable for the
countless abuses that the Syrian people have endured.

II.
Factual Background: Telecommunications Infrastructure and Key
Players
The internet provides an essential platform for populations and governments to communicate, share ideas, and
access essential information, services and networks. Much of today’s communication, organizing, and
collaboration happens on digital networks, through email, Voice-over-Internet Protocol applications and services
(VoIP-like WhatsApp), social media accounts, and online platforms. As of 2010, almost 2 billion people around
the world had access to the internet through computers or mobile devices. 7 In 2010, only 17.7% of the Syrian
population, or 3.9 million individuals, had access to the internet.8 This number has dropped significantly over the
last ten years. In 2020, only 4.2% of the Syrian population had access to the internet. 9 Syria ranked as 12th out
of 14 Middle Eastern countries, in terms of population percentage that uses the internet. 10 The number of mobile
users or connections is significantly higher. As of January 2020, according to Data Reportal, the number of
mobile internet users was 5.75 million, or 31% of the total population.11 Mobile phones have played a key role in
7

Roser, Max, et al. Internet. OUR WORLD DATA, available at: https://ourworldindata.org/internet.
Internet Usage in the Middle East, INTERNET WORLD STATS, available at: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm.
9 Internet Usage in the Middle East, supra note 8.
10
Internet Usage in the Middle East, supra note 8.
11 Simon Kemp, Digital 2020: Syria, DATAREPORTAL (Feb. 18. 2020), at: https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-syria.
8

2

Syria, “enabling ‘citizen journalists’ to capture events on the ground…[which] have served as a crucial source of
information on the uprising.”12 Social media and other platforms are primarily used to disseminate information,
to follow unfolding events, and to voice opinions and support for movements or ideas.13

A. The Infrastructure of Surveillance
The Syrian telecommunications market is the most restricted and regulated among all Middle Eastern countries,
based on the percentage of State-owned telecommunications infrastructure.14 The state-owned Syrian
Telecommunications Establishment (“STE”) is both an internet service provider (ISP) and the official
telecommunications regulator. STE has a monopoly over wired and wireless services throughout the regime
controlled areas of the country.15 While the state has licensed to other smaller private providers, these providers
rely on government infrastructure and are subject to state regulations.16 Through this control, the regime not only
censors information based on political, social, and religious beliefs, but can also conduct surveillance of internet
users in Syria.17 In essence, the STE provides the government control over what content the population can and
cannot interact with on the internet.
In 2007, Nazem Bahsas, the head of the STE, solicited bids from companies to build a new “Central Monitoring
System for public data networks and the Internet.”18 In 2008, the Syrian government solicited more requests for
bids to build its surveillance system,19 which would be a content filtering system20 combatting politically
inopportune speech.21 Content filtering allows for the analysis of communication data packets through key words
or attributes, which can then be stored for further analysis, blocked, or allowed to pass through without being
stored. Alarmingly, Bahsas requested and clarified that this new system would be centralized so that it could
have the capability of monitoring all telecommunications data inside Syria.22 Additionally, Bahsas demanded real
time location tracking ability of up to fifty targets and that the monitoring be completely undetected by the Syrians
who are being monitored.23 In other words, the Syrian regime sought the capability to select any Syrian individual
for any reason, monitor every website they visit, track their mobile device to determine their real time location,
and do all of this without the individual knowing they are being tracked.24 While the STE claimed this authority
was needed to ensure system security from hacking and foreign and domestic infiltration, the power to surveille
that this system delivered for the regime and the subsequent targeting, torture and killing of dissenters tells a
different story.25
In December 2008, the Syrian regime explained to prospective bidders that it was not interested in combating
“classic spam.”26 Rather, it was concerned with “propaganda mail which has the shape of spam.” 27 Within the
context of the state-run STE system, this is troubling. Because the government has the power to determine what
12

Olesya Tkacheva et. al, Internet Freedom and Political Space (2013) 85.
Id. at 86.
14 Syria, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Aug. 7, 2009), available at: https://opennet.net/research/profiles/Syria.
15 OpenNet Initiative, supra note 14.
16 Tkacheva, supra note 12, at 85.
17 OpenNet Initiative, supra note 14.
18 Open Season, supra note 2.
19 Open Season, supra note 2, at 16.
20 Open Season, supra note 2, at 16 (“Content filtering, in the context of communications traveling across the PDN and the internet,
means analyzing the communications data packets and assessing them for key words or attributes, and then either blocking
transmission of that message, storing a copy for further analysis, or letting the message pass through without storage. Such
technologies are also widely used for censorship, particularly at politically sensitive moments, such as during public protests.”).
21 Open Season, supra note 2.
22 Open Season, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
23 Open Season, supra note 2, at 14.
24 Open Season, supra note 2.
25 Open Season, supra note 2.
26
Open Season, supra note 2, at 17.
27 Open Season, supra note 2.
13

3

constitutes “propaganda mail”, it has the authority to impose severe censorship on those it deems critical of or a
threat to the regime. Furthermore, since the network infrastructure is completely run by the government, Syrian
individuals have no opportunity to view content deemed as “propaganda mail” nor to decide for themselves
whether to view it or not.28
According to Fredric Jacobs, a researcher that spent time in Syria, “[e]very single piece of traffic that goes
through [the Syrian network] is being recorded to hard disk drives.”29 These drives are controlled and stockpiled
by the Syrian regime.30 Throughout the Syrian conflict that began in 2011, reports31 surfaced indicating that the
regime monitored and tracked human rights defenders through digital surveillance in order to arbitrarily arrest,
detain, torture, and kill them as a result of their resistance.32
Mobile phone access is much more prevalent, making mobile service providers a key part of the
telecommunications infrastructure. An estimated 55 percent of the country’s cellular market is dominated by
Syriatel, a regime affiliated provider.33 MTN Syria is the other major mobile service provider, a subsidiary of
South African MTN. As outlined in Section IV below, MTN is subject to government regulation and has complied
with government orders when it comes to filtering and blocking telecommunications of its users. The regime
access to and surveillance of mobile phones is particularly consequential given the role mobile phones, in the
hands of activists and human rights defenders, has come to play in bearing witness to the Civil War and ongoing
violence in Syria. “The mobile phone has become the star of the popular revolutions…This small instrument has
actually become stronger than the television cameras.”34 Where outside observers and the international media
fail to gain access to the country and local reporters and journalists are targeted and silenced, the citizen
journalist has become the main witness and recorder of the situation in Syria.

B. Regime Intelligence Agencies
There are four main intelligence agencies in Syria, military and civilian. Their leadership and scope of operations
is difficult to precisely identify as these agencies are secretive and the political situation is in constant state of
flux.35 The four agencies are: (1) The Department of Military Intelligence; (2) The Air Force Intelligence
Directorate; (3) The General Intelligence Directorate; and (4) The Political Security Directorate.36 The Military
Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence fall under the Ministry of Defense. The General Intelligence Directorate
and the Political Security Directorate fall under the remit of the Ministry of Interior. Each agency has multiple
branches. The Department of Military Intelligence alone has 20 different branches. This means there are
countless intelligence branches with responsibilities ranging from surveilling and controlling military and security

28

Open Season, supra note 2, at 16-17.
Id.
30 Id.
31 Nicole Perlroth, Hunting for Syrian Hackers’ Chain of Command, NYTIMES (May 17, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/18/technology/financial-times-site-is-hacked.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Now sleuths are trying to
figure out how much overlap there is between the rowdy pranks playing out on Twitter and the silent spying that also increasingly
includes the monitoring of foreign aid workers.”).
32 See, e.g., Whittaker, supra note 3 (“[P]eople in Syria were being tracked online, and that information was being used to hunt down
protesters.”).
33 Tkacheva, supra note 12, at 85.
34 “Mashhadiyāt Sūrīya [Vignettes from Syria],” al Hayat, March 26, 2012, quoted in
Tkacheva, supra note 12, at 85.
35 Human Rights Watch, “By All Means Necessary” Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria
(2011) 90, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/12/15/all-means-necessary/individual-and-command-responsibility-crimesagainst-humanity (“Given the secretive nature of the Syrian intelligence agencies, it is very difficult to verify information about their
structure and commanders.”).
36 Id.
29
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officers, to monitoring and surveilling opposition forces, as well as monitoring and targeting civilian activists and
critics.
Within the Department of Military Intelligence there are a number of branches focusing on civilian surveillance
and associated operations. For example, according to one report, there is Branch 211 within Military Intelligence,
also known as the “Technical Branch or the Automatic Computer Branch or simply the Computer Branch.”37 This
Branch monitors online activity and is involved in the blocking and unblocking of websites as well as providing
support services to other surveillance branches, including Branch 225.
Branch 225, referred to as the “Communication Branch,” is also part of the Department of Military Intelligence,
though it’s current placement within the state architecture is unclear. Branch 225 focuses on phone
communications. It can “[block] specific numbers or [cut] off calls or [disable] SMS services.”38 The Branch can
tap phones and surveille mobile phone communications. The Branch can stop a text message once it has been
sent but before it arrives to the designated number. Some reports suggest that Branch 225 also monitors internet
communications and is at the forefront of the regime’s surveillance activities.39 According to the Violations
Documentation Center in Syria, this Branch has ballooned into a full department, affiliated with the
Communications Department, and drawing officers from all four intelligence agencies.40
These surveillance divisions are part of a larger state architecture of military and security forces involved in the
arrest, detention, torture and killing of the Syrian people.

C. The Syrian Electronic Army and Third-Party Hacking
The state infrastructure of surveillance is further supplemented by the monitoring and hacking performed by state
affiliated third-party hacking groups.41 These hacking groups are predominately referred to as “state-sponsored
hackers.”42 State-sponsored hackers is a term used broadly to refer to hackers that are aligned with a
government.43 While the prevailing term is “state-sponsored hackers,” this report refers to the Syrian Malware
Team (“SMT”) and Syrian Electronic Army (“SEA”) as “state-sanctioned hackers” in order to more clearly reflect
the nature of the relationship. The two most prominent state-sanctioned hackers in Syria are the SEA and the

37 A Report on Branch 215, Raid Brigade Military Intelligence Division—Damascus “A Conflict Between Death and Hope” Violations
Documentation Centre in Syria (Sept. 2013) 6, available at https://www.vdc-sy.info/pdf/reports/1380463510-English.pdf.
38 See e.g. Mark Clayton, Syria’s Cyberwars: Using Social Media Against Dissent, Christian Science Monitor (Jul. 25, 2012), available
at https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0725/Syria-s-cyberwars-using-social-media-against-dissent.
39 Clayton, supra note 38.
40 A Report on Branch 215, supra note 37, at 6.
41 Third party hacking groups are hacking entities that are not officially governmental but may still be supplying the government with
information obtained through hacking. See, e.g., Eva Galperin, Morgan Marquis-Boire, & John Scott-Railton, Quantum of Surveillance:
Familiar Actors and Possible False Flags in Syrian Malware Campaigns, Electronic Frontier Foundation, available at:
https://www.eff.org/document/quantum-surveillance-familiar-actors-and-possible-false-flags-syrian-malware-campaigns (last visited
Mar. 10, 2019) (establishing connections between certain Syrian malware and the Syrian government).
42 See, e.g., Kim Peretti, Emily Poole, & Nameir Abbas, 10 Lessons From US Indictments of State-Sponsored Hackers, Law360 (Jan.
31, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1123471/10-lessons-from-us-indictments-of-state-sponsored-hackers (outlining recent
attacks by hackers with state connections); see also Cathal McMahon, Exclusive: EirGrid Targeted by ‘State Sponsored’ Hackers
Leaving Networks Exposed to ‘Devious Attack’, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 6, 2017), available at: https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/statesponsored-hackers-targeted-eirgrid-electricity-network-in-devious-attack-36005921.html (discussing state sponsored hackers).
43 JLT, What Does State Sponsored Hacking Mean?, Marsh (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.jltspecialty.com/ourinsights/publications/cyber-decoder/what-does-state-sponsored-hacking-mean; see also Tal Kopan, DNC Hack: What You Need to
Know, CNN (Jun. 21, 2016, 1:30 PM), available at: https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/21/politics/dnc-hack-russians-guccifer-claims/ (Many
governments worldwide have high-level cyberespionage groups working for them, who may target secrets from other governments,
intelligence agencies, government contractors, think tanks and academics.”); Sam Kim, Inside North Korea’s Hacker Army, Bloomberg
(Feb. 7, 2018), available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-02-07/inside-kim-jong-un-s-hacker-army (Chronicling the
lives of hackers that work at the behest of the North Korean government).
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SMT.44 While some reports refer to these two organizations as the same entity, others differentiate the two.45
SEA is known to be directly linked to the Syrian regime. The exact nature of SMT’s connection to SEA and the
regime is up for debate. For example, certain members of the SMT have ties to the SEA. Connections like this
suggest that the SMT may be a possible offshoot or part of the SEA.46 Although the extent of their entanglement
may be disputed, it is undeniable that both groups provide support to the Syrian regime.47 In 2011, Assad affirmed
the SEA’s existence and that its work benefits the Syrian army, calling them the “real army in virtual reality.”48
In 2011, following anti-government demonstrations and Assad vowing to quash his “opponents with an iron fist”
through violence and surveillance, the SEA thanked him for recognizing them and their role in the suppression
of dissenters.49 The SEA warned anti-regime media, “our message to the news agencies and reporters: if you
have a shortage of professionals to report the correct news … the hordes of the Syrian Electronic Army will not
be forgiving with you.”50 After the SEA released this message, the group continued to target opponents of the
regime.51
One of the first internationally recognized targets of the SEA was Harvard University. 52 There, the SEA hacked
the Harvard homepage and replaced it with an image of Bashar al-Assad and wrote the message: “Syrian
Electronic Army were here.”53 The SEA then accused the United States of actively working to overthrow the
Syrian government.54 This anti-U.S. message along with other consistent SEA attacks, and the hacking of
Harvard’s website, led Harvard University to investigate the domain name of the SEA.55 Investigation results
indicated that the SEA was created by the Syrian Computer Society; a group that was created by Bashar alAssad prior to him assuming power.56 The Syrian Computer Society was instrumental in providing the platform
for the SEA to accomplish their hacking goals.57
The Harvard University hack was only the beginning of SEA’s infiltration of foreign entities through hacking.
Between 2011 and 2014, the SEA vandalized numerous other websites, including Forbes, CNBC, The
Telegraph, The Chicago Tribune, Human Rights Watch, and UNICEF.58 A message on the homepage of Human

44

See Kyle Wilhoit & Thoufique Haq, Connecting the Dots: Syrian Malway Team Uses Blackworm for Attacks, FIREEYE (Aug. 29, 2014),
available at: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/connecting-the-dots-syrian-malware-team-uses-blackworm-forattacks.html.
45 See Wilhoit & Haq, supra note 44; see also Kaspersky Law Global Research and Analysis Team, Syrian Malware, The Ever-Evolving
Threat 31 (2018), available at: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08074802/KL_report_syrian_malware.pdf (hypothesizing that hacker operations are more likely
different groups working together).
46 See Wilhoit & Haq, supra note 44.
47 Kaspersky Law Global Research and Analysis Team, supra note 45; see also 360 Gold Rat Organization—Targeted Attacks in Syria,
Threat Intelligence Center (Jan. 4, 2018), available at: https://blogs.360.cn/post/SEA_role_influence_cyberattacks.html (describing the
relationship between hackers and the Syrian government).
48 Harding, Luke and Charles Arthur, “Syrian Electronic Army: Assad’s cyber warriors.” THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2013), available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/apr/29/hacking-guardian-syria-background.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See Rodrique Ngowi, Harvard Website Hacked, Defaced, A.P. (Sept. 27, 2011), available at:
http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/09/27/harvard_website_hacked_defaced/ (explaining the details of
the hack on Harvard’s website, which was conducted in 2011—the same year anti-Assad protests began).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58
Katrina Bishop, Global Websites Hacked by Syrian Electronic Army, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2014), available at:
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/27/global-websites-hacked-by-syrian-electronic-army.html.
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Rights Watch, an NGO dedicated to documenting abuses of human rights in Syria and around the world, said
“Syrian Electronic Army Was Here. All Your reports are FALSE!!! Stop lying!!!”59
In order to gain access to these websites, the SEA utilized “phishing.”60 While “spear phishing” is targeted
towards an individual, often using personal information, “phishing” targets a large group of individuals in an
attempt to steal information.61 In these SEA phishing attacks, hackers sent emails to news outlets and
organizations with links embedded with malware capable of transmitting location and intercepting
communications.62 Once the user opened the link, malware installed itself onto the computer or electronic
device.63
This phishing technique was used by the SEA to hack into the Associated Press (“AP”). After successfully
phishing an AP employee, SEA hackers then used the AP’s twitter account to publish a false news story,
“Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured.”64 Fortunately, the tweet was
quickly determined to be baseless, but the damage had already been done. The initial panic caused by the fake
tweet resulted in a loss of “$136 billion in equity market value.”65 Further, the SEA has successfully used these
phishing techniques to gain access to the websites of The New York Times, the United Nations Human Rights
Council, and Microsoft.66 One of the SEA hackers, a Syrian national called Peter Romar, was arrested and
convicted for participating in these attacks.67
The SEA also directed its capabilities and gained access to information on regime opponents and critics within
Syria. The SEA shared information of anti-Assad activists’ meeting locations and identities directly with the Syrian
regime. For example, in 2013 SEA members hacked into the messaging app “Tango” and stole the personal
phone numbers, email addresses and contact information for millions of people.68 While Tango acknowledged a
data breach, it did not confirm the extent of the information stolen, nor the method the SEA used to access the
data.69 After obtaining the Tango information, the SEA announced that it would be “handing the information over
to its country’s government”— the regime. Experts expressed concern that this would almost certainly lead to
people being hurt or worse.70 The SEA also obtained sensitive data about individual activists through other social
media platforms and messaging apps.71 This sensitive data included, people’s birthdays, personal serial
numbers, ID cards, CVs, and blood types.72

59

Max Fisher, Syria’s Pro-Assad Hackers Infiltrate Human Rights Watch Website and Twitter Feed, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2013),
available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/03/17/syrias-pro-assad-hackers-infiltrate-human-rights-watchweb-site-and-twitter-feed/?utm_term=.9452432eb8b9.
60 Fisher, supra note 5.
61 Phishing, Microsoft Windows available at: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threatprotection/intelligence/phishing#spear-phishing (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
62 Fisher, supra note 59.
63 Id.
64 AP Twitter account hacked in fake ‘White House blasts’ post, BBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2013), available at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-21508660.
65 Id.
66 Lee Ferran, Inside the Syrian Electronic Army, REAL CLEAR LIFE (June 2018), available at:
http://www.realclearlife.com/technology/inside-the-syrian-electronic-army/.
67 Department of Justice, Syrian Electronic Army Hacker Pleads Guilty, (Sept. 28, 2016), available at:
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/syrian-electronic-army-hacker-pleads-guilty.
68 Jacob Kastrenakes, Syrian Electronic Army Alleges Stealing “Millions” of Phone Numbers from Chat App Tango, VERGE (July 22,
2013), available at: https://www.theverge.com/2013/7/22/4545838/sea-giving-hacked-tango-database-government.
69 Id.
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71 Id.
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See John Scott Railton, Daniel Regalado, Nart Villeneuve, Behind the Syrian Conflict’s Digital Frontlines, 7-9 (Feb. 2015), available
at: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-behind-the-syria-conflict.pdf.
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SEA has used SMT malware, which some speculate has been developed with some assistance from Russia
and/or Iran.73 SMT malware is capable of remotely turning on a target’s phone or computer and extracting files,
contact lists, location data, passwords, and, in some cases, has the ability to copy all contents and programs on
a user’s phone.74 One expert noted, “the minute you download this it will take control over your computer…[it]
can turn on your phone camera, it can extract files” from any electronic device it is installed on.75 While the older
SEA monitoring techniques featured short, abrupt—often unsophisticated—messages accompanying the attack,
alerting the user;76 the new malware runs and functions like professional, legitimate programs, resulting in the
user being less likely to know they are being monitored or had any sensitive information stolen. 77

D. Mass Surveillance and Persecution
The regime controlled telecommunications infrastructure and a drove of state and state-sanctioned surveillance
forces have empowered the Assad regime to conduct indiscriminate mass digital surveillance of the Syrian
population.78 The Syrian Ministry of Communications has created a network that allows the government nearly
complete authority over the internet.79 The regime monitors all online activity and websites for any content that
is anti-regime.80 As Section IV below shows, the regime then uses any content that it deems “revolutionary” to
persecute critics and human rights defenders.81 The vast and comprehensive scale at which this digital
surveillance has occurred and is occurring inside Syria should be a great cause of concern for the international
community as a whole.
Section III outlines the human rights implicated by mass surveillance. While the rights of all Syrian people,
especially anyone critical of the regime, are endangered and have been breached as a result of surveillance, the
rights of human rights defenders have been disproportionately impacted. The right to privacy, freedom of
expression and of participation, the right to life and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment are all at stake in the regime’s, and its affiliated groups’, campaign of surveillance and persecution.
Section IV identifies how the infrastructure of surveillance together with an enabling legal framework has led to
censorship, monitoring, hacking and detention of journalists, activists and human rights defenders.

III.

Human Rights and Surveillance

The Syrian regime’s control over the telecommunications infrastructure is pervasive and has been deployed to
monitor and silence, sometimes permanently, journalists, activists and those working to protect human rights in
the country. The human rights of the Syrian people are being breached by the surveillance capacity of the state.
The Syrian Arab Republic is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
73
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77 Railton, supra note 72.
78 Kastrenakes, supra note 68.
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https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/world/middleeast/23facebook.html.
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Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT), and is obligated to
promote and protect the human rights of its’ people.82 These treaties guarantee the right to privacy; freedom of
expression and the right to take part in public affairs; the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhumane and
degrading treatment; the right to life; and the right to a remedy when any of these rights have been breached.
This report documents the violations of the right to privacy of individuals in Syria through an illegal and arbitrary
surveillance framework. This report also documents the breaches of other rights that follow from that surveillance
and how the regime and its affiliated groups have hacked, tracked and targeted those critical of the regime.
While the rights of all people are endangered and are being breached, the surveillance regime has especially
targeted and impacted the rights and lives of human rights defenders working in and out of the country to protect
the human rights of the Syrian people. A “human rights defender” is anyone that works—alone or as part of a
larger organization—in striving for the realization and protection of human rights. 83 Human rights defenders are
identified above all by the actions they take to protect or further the protection of human rights.84 Although anyone
that defends human rights is a human rights defender, the most common examples of human rights defenders
include lawyers, government officials, NGO workers, journalists, professors, and persons engaged in social
movements for transformative change.85
Michel Frost, former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, explained that
international human rights law “attaches particular importance to the special role of human rights defenders.” 86
Human rights defenders are not granted more rights, but rather, since human rights defenders are vulnerable
based on the type of work they do, they are afforded a higher duty of human rights protections. 87 Therefore,
States must take necessary measures to ensure that human rights defenders are safe in “exercise[ing] the rights
to freedom of opinion, expression, peaceful assembly and association, which are essential for the promotion and
protection of [all] human rights.”88 States must take steps to ensure protection of human right defenders by
refraining from portraying human rights defenders and their activities as dangerous, illegal or a threat to the
security of the State.89 States are also required to act with due diligence in preventing, investigating, and
punishing those who violate the rights of human rights defenders.90 This requires an effective legal system and
a functioning and independent judiciary capable of holding violators accountable. While the human rights of all
82

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 16, 1966); Convention Against Torture and
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83
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84Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, 2,
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the right to be free from torture as it relates to a human rights defender); Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1782/2008,
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people have been breached and continue to be in danger, the rights of human rights defenders are systematically
and disproportionately impacted.
This section identifies the human rights implicated by the surveillance capabilities of the Syrian regime. The next
section sets out how surveillance leads to tracking, hacking and violence in breach of these rights.

A. The Right to Privacy
A surveillance state with the capabilities to monitor and track its people implicates the privacy rights of everyone.
Syria’s surveillance system operates pursuant to arbitrary and imprecise legal standards, breaching the privacy
rights of its people and facilitating further human rights violations from the right to freedom of expression to the
right to life. Article 17 of the ICCPR protects individuals from arbitrary or unlawful interference with their “privacy,
family, home or correspondence.”91 Violations of the right to privacy can occur when a state intercepts
correspondence, including electronic and non-electronic correspondence such as letters, emails, or social media
activity.92 Other invasions of privacy include collecting metadata regarding communications,93 audio-visual
observation,94 GPS tracking,95 and the unauthorized storing and subsequent use of personal information. 96
Privacy is not an absolute right, it may be interfered with to advance legitimate state interests so long as that
interference is lawful, necessary and proportionate.97
The term "unlawful" means that no interference can take place except in cases authorized by law.98 To meet the
requirement that an invasion of privacy be lawful, the surveillance program must be justified by legislation.99 The
legislation must be consistent with the provisions, aims, and objectives of the Covenant, pursuant to domestic
and international law, foreseeable and accessible in a manner that is timely and accurate, 100 precise, specific
and clearly defined.101 A law is accessible when it is not left to “secret” determinations by unaccountable bodies,
91

ICCPR, supra note 82, Article 17.
UN HRC, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
27th session, 2nd and 3rd agenda item, A/HRC/27/37 (explaining that correspondence covers electronic correspondence); Human
Rights Committee, Communication 2079/2011, Khadzhiev v. Turkmenistan, views adopted 1 April 2015, para. 8.8 (holding that
interference with mail from a prisoner to his family violates the right to privacy).
93 Malone v. United Kingdom, (Judgment), App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 84 (1984); see also UN HRC, The Right to
Privacy in the Digital Age: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 27th session, 2nd and 3rd
agenda item, A/HRC/27/37 (“The aggregation of information commonly referred to as ‘metadata’ may give an insight into an individual’s
behavior, social relationships, private preferences and identity that go beyond even that conveyed by accessing the content of a private
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94 El-Haski v. Belgium, App. No. 649/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
95 Uzan v. Germany, (Judgment), App. No. 35623/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 12-13 (2010).
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98 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 21 (1994), available at:
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrcom16.htm.
99 High Comm’r For Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Right to Privacy in the
Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014) paras. 22-23 (citing Communication No. 903/1999, Van Hulst v. Netherlands,
Views adopted Nov. 1, 2004; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of
America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (2014); Uzun v. Germany, (Judgment), App. No. 35623/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2010); Weber v. Germany,
(Decision), App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 4 (2006); Escher v. Brazil (Judgment), IACHR (Nov. 20, 2009); Martin Sheinin
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(Dec. 28, 2009); Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013)).
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101 See Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 2081/2011, D.T. v. Canada, views adopted July 15, 2016, para. 7.10 (holding
that a violation of the right to privacy occurred although the violation—deportation of an individual to Nigeria—was provided for in
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and it is “foreseeable” when the consequences of a given action is known, in order to allow people to regulate
their conduct in accordance with the law.102 Domestic law must be “precise” and “clearly” defined. To be clear
and precise, the legal justification for surveillance must “precisely define” the situations in which the interception,
collection, and analysis of communications is legally justified.103
Human Rights Council General Comment 16 recognizes that “gathering and holding of personal information on
computers, databanks and other devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies must be
regulated by law.”104 However, even when the surveillance is authorized by law, that surveillance can still interfere
with the privacy rights of individuals. Therefore, the law itself must meet substantive standards and ensure the
interference is not arbitrary or disproportionate.105 Legislation that “allows a system for the secret monitoring of
communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation may be applied. This threat
necessarily strikes at freedom of communication between users of the telecommunications services and thereby
amounts in itself to an interference with the exercise of the applicants’ rights.”106 In other words, legislation that
permits secret surveillance without clear standards and processes for establishing specific justifications is in
itself an interference with the privacy rights of the people.
Any interference authorized by law must also satisfy the principle of proportionality. For a surveillance program
to meet the requirement of proportionality, any interference with privacy must be necessary given the
circumstances,107 and must be proportionate to the legitimate aim it seeks to address.108 To satisfy
proportionality, the law must have a legitimate aim, have a rational connection to that aim, minimally impair the
right to privacy, and strike a fair balance between pursuit of the aim and limitation of the right.109 The
proportionality test applies even in cases where national security concerns are implicated.
Merely stating that secret mass digital surveillance is necessary for safety or national security does not satisfy
proportionality.110 The state justifying the surveillance must produce “sufficient factual basis for the application of
secret intelligence gathering measures” that would justify any surveillance “on the basis of an individual suspicion
regarding the target person.”111 The law must also use the least intrusive method to obtain the desired result.112
the entire selection process, including the selection of bearers for interception, the selectors and search criteria for filtering intercepted
communications, and the selection of material for examination by an analyst; and secondly, the absence of any real safeguards
applicable to the selection of related communications data for examination. In view of these shortcomings and to the extent just
outlined, the Court finds that that the [national law] does not meet the ‘quality of law’ requirement and is incapable of keeping the
‘interference’ to what is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.”); see
also The Human Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, ACLU (Feb. 2015) available at: https://www.aclu.org/other/human-right-privacydigital-age.
102 Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, supra note 99 (“Secret rules and secrete interpretations—even secret judicial interpretations—of
law do not have the necessary qualities of law.”).
103 Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Freedom of Expression and the
Internet, (Dec., 31 2013); see also Malone v. United Kingdom, (Judgment), App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 79 (1984).
104 General Comment 16, supra note 97, at 10 (1994).
105 General Comment 16, provides that interferences “provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and
objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances (emphasis added).” General
Comment 16, supra note 97, at para. 4; See also, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations, Jamaica, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.83 at para. 20 (Nov. 19, 1997)
[hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on Jamaica].; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Comments, Russian Federation, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.54 at para.
19 (July 26, 1995) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on Russia].
106 Weber v. Germany, (Decision), App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 78 (2006).
107 Id.; see also Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 2273/2013, Vondom v. Republic of Korea, views adopted July 7, 2018,
para. 8.7.
108 Id.; see also Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 2326/2013, N.K. v. Netherlands, views adopted July 18, 2017, paras.
9.3-9.11 (holding that an interference with privacy, although minor, was disproportionate to the legitimate aim the DNA collection
program sought to address).
109 The Human Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, supra note 101.
110 Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary, (Judgment), Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 37138/14, paras. 71-73 (2016).
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Further, there must be “a rational connection between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved,”
as well as a balanced relationship between the public need and the privacy interference.113 As outlined in Section
IV, the legal infrastructure empowering the Syrian regime’s surveillance operations fails to satisfy the legality and
the proportionality requirements established by international law. No legislation clearly articulates the scope and
limits of surveillance powers.

B. Freedom of Expression and the Right to Participate in Public Affairs
Surveillance, particularly when coupled with censorship, intimidation and violence, breaches the peoples’ right
to freedom of expression and interferes with the peoples’ right to fully participate in public affairs. Article 19 of
the ICCPR states that “everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference,” and “everyone shall
have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.”114
Article 19 protects the ability of all persons to freely exchange ideas.115 Because part of the work that human
rights defenders do is to report human rights abuses and provide a voice for victims of human rights violations,
their ability to freely share information and ideas is essential to the nature of their work.116 The right to freely hold
and express opinions guarantees the right “to receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers and through any medium.”117 The protection of human rights more broadly is enhanced when human
rights defenders are able to share ideas and information with the rest of the population and the world.118
Therefore, there must be an environment that permits and protects the ability of all persons, including human
rights defenders, to freely form, hold, and express opinions and to publicize and share information.119
Although the right to freely hold and express opinions may be limited by national law in select situations, any
such limitation must be necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim. 120 There are two legitimate aims
identified by the Convention: “(a) for the respect of the rights and reputation of others and (b) for the protection
113
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1553/2007, Korneenko v. Belarus, (Judgment), views adopted Mar. 20, 2009; Big Brother Watch and Others v. The United Kingdom,
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of national security or public order (odre public) or public health or morals.”121 Vague and unsubstantiated claims
of national security cannot satisfy the requirements established by international law for what amounts to a
necessary and proportionate interference.122 Where surveillance is used specifically to silence criticism and is
part of a system of state violence, the interference fails to advance a legitimate aim and to satisfy the principle
of proportionality and the right is breached.123
All persons have the right to freely participate in public affairs as guaranteed by Article 25 of the ICCPR. 124 To
freely participate includes the right to vote, the right to be elected, and the right to access public benefits.125 The
right to participation is critical to the advancement of all human rights because it promotes democracy, the rule
of law, social inclusion, and economic development. 126 The right to participation protects and provides for
individuals and communities to actively engage in decision-making processes that affect them.127 As it relates to
human rights defenders, the universal human right to participate in public affairs extends beyond the state and
into the international human rights system.128
Like the right to privacy and the right to freely hold and express opinions, the right to participation is threatened
by the very existence of mass digital surveillance technology.129 Mass digital surveillance prevents people from
fully participating in public life due to potential fears of retribution and violence.130

C. Right to Life and Freedom from Torture and CIDT
As Section IV below documents, mass surveillance can be a key tool in a state’s campaign of suppression and
violence. When surveillance facilitates the torture and extrajudicial killing of people, then it leads to the breach
of the right to life and the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Both rights
are non-derogable, meaning no justification of war or national security can excuse the state from having to
protect the peoples’ right to be free from torture and extrajudicial killing. Article 6 of the ICCPR guarantees that
“[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.”131 As stated in General Comment 36 of the Human Rights Committee, “the effective
protection of [the right to life] is the prerequisite for the enjoyment of all other human rights and the content of
121
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which can be informed by other human rights.”132 States are required to refrain from any conduct that can result
in the arbitrary loss of life. Arbitrariness must be interpreted “broadly to include elements of inappropriateness,
injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and
proportionality.”133 Where a legal system fails to safeguard life, to ensure proper investigations of the loss of life
and processes for accountability and redress, the right to life is breached.
Article 7 of ICCPR guarantees that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”134 Article 2 of the CAT requires states to “take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture.”135 The right to be free from torture protects individuals from
physical or mental torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.136 Article 1 of the CAT recognizes that
torture can occur by “means of any act by which severe pain or suffering whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person.”137 States breach their obligation to protect individuals from torture through
their acts or omissions, irrespective of their justification under domestic law.138
Where state surveillance leads to the arrest, detention and torture of critics and human rights defenders, the right
to be free from torture and the right to life are breached. In an environment where speaking up against the regime
or documenting human rights violations committed by the state can lead to immediate reprisal, surveillance and
violence are part and parcel of a unified campaign of repression and violence.

D. The Right to a Remedy
To ensure the rights enumerated above, the state is obligated, through a functioning legal system, to provide
processes through which people can vindicate their rights and be provided a remedy when rights are violated.139
Article 2 of the ICCPR requires states to provide any person who has their rights or freedoms violated access to
an effective remedy.140 A remedy may be procedural in nature, such a judicial remedy or an independent
investigation, or substantive in nature, such as a reparation.141
The right to effective remedy is imperative to establishing a “safe and enabling environment” for human rights
defenders.142 The Human Rights Council laid out five key elements in how States should maintain this “safe and
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enabling environment”;143 they are: (1) a robust legal framework that is compliant with international standards as
well as a strong national human rights protection system that safeguards public freedoms and ensures effective
access to justice; (2) a political environment conducive to civil society work; (3) access to information; (4)
avenues for participation by civil society in decision-making processes; (5) and long-term support and resources
for civil society.
As the following section shows, the Syrian state’s campaign of mass surveillance and violence has led to the
breach of the human rights of the Syrian people, most especially of journalists, activists, and human rights
defenders. The legal infrastructure has failed to protect human rights, on paper and in practice. In fact, the legal
and institutional infrastructure of the state has facilitated the systematic violation of the peoples’ rights to privacy,
freedom of expression and of participation, the right to life and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment.

IV. How Surveillance Leads to Censorship, Monitoring, Hacking and
Violence
The unchecked and pervasive power of surveillance exercised by the Syrian regime and affiliated groups, is a
key cog in the machinery of state control and violence. That power is established and unleashed through a
flawed legal and institutional infrastructure that provides for broad authority and lacks institutional processes for
oversight and accountability.144 This power has been used by the regime in various ways to silence, torture, and
kill human rights defenders and those the State deems a threat. Surveillance has facilitated censorship on the
internet and interference with access; hacking, tracking and monitoring of journalists, human rights defenders
and critics of the regime; and the detention, torture and execution of journalists, human rights defenders and
critics of the regime. As a result, the Syrian peoples’ ability to express themselves, to share information and
ideas, to organize and participate in political life without fear of immediate and severe reprisal is systematically
extinguished. These acts of control and violence are facilitated by tools and technologies supplied by
multinational and foreign corporate entities. Lack of corporate accountability further undermines efforts to
challenge and stop the Assad regime’s ongoing assault on safety and security of the Syrian people.

A. Abuse Enabling Legal and Institutional Infrastructure
The state is required to establish a legal framework and institutions to ensure human rights obligations it has
taken on under international law and duties it owes to its people. The protection of the right to privacy, the right
to life and freedom from torture, all require a legislative and institutional infrastructure that empowers and limits
official actors and provides for processes of oversight and accountability. The legal framework authorizing the
state’s power to surveil, to detain, and to punish, however, provides broad grants of power and authorizes the
targeting, arrest and prosecution of individuals for vague and imprecise interests. No privacy protecting
legislation exists to safeguard the rights of people from illegal and disproportionate government surveillance, and
the penal and cyber laws set imprecise standards and allow for broad discretion and authority. This legal
framework has been used to surveille and punish individuals engaged in or suspected of opposing the regime.
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144 See generally United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Syria 2019 Human Rights
Report, available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/SYRIA-2019-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf (last visited Dec.
2, 2020).
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Lack of judicial independence and an institutional infrastructure that facilitates human rights violations means
there are no checks and no remedies for those pursued and ensnared by the regime.
The regime has relied on a set of laws granting the government broad discretion to arrest and prosecute
individuals it deems a threat. Most prominently, the Penal Code 148/1949, Media Law 108/2011, the Cybercrime
Law 17/2012 and the Anti-Cybercrime Law 9/2018 have been used to prosecute internet users, journalists and
dissidents for vague offenses that grant the state almost absolute discretion. These offenses include “threatening
national unity” or “publishing false news that may weaken national sentiment.”145
While the constitution sets general due process guarantees, the lack of a rule of law oriented legal infrastructure
means the constitutional guarantees are little more than paper promises. As a result, the right to privacy and the
related rights to freedom of expression, freedom from torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, the
right to liberty and of life are systematically undermined.
Syria’s Emergency Law, enacted in 1963 - the day that the Assad Baath party (under Hafez al-Assad) seized
power – provided government agents the right to both monitor and imprison individuals with no explanation or
justification.146 This law suppressed rights guaranteed in the Syrian Constitution, such as freedom of assembly,
freedom of speech, and freedom of movement by granting Syrian authorities wide latitude to arrest and detain
individuals without due process or access to lawyers.147 Specifically, the Emergency Law gave the government
nearly unlimited authority to restrict individual freedoms and to investigate and detain suspects when national
security and public safety were deemed to be at risk.148 Further, the law granted the government authority to
detain anyone who opposed the Syrian regime, including journalists, lawyers, and other human rights defenders
with no legal justification beyond that of unspecified interests of national security.149
As a response to the protests in 2011, Bashar al-Assad repealed the Emergency Law.150 However, since its
repeal, there has been no real change in practice and similarly problematic legislation remained in place while
new problematic legislation was enacted to take its place. Journalists and human rights defenders have been
charged and detained pursuant to Article 285 and 286 of the Penal Code for undermining national unity and
promoting fake news.151 Media Law 108/2011, the Cybercrime Law 17/2012 and the subsequent Anti-Cybercrime
Law 9/2018 grant the government authority to arrest individuals for their online expressions with little or no judicial
oversight. The 2012 Cybercrime Law requires website owners “to save a copy of their content and traffic data to
allow verification of the identity of persons who contribute content on the network.” 152 In other words, the law
requires websites not only to publish the names of the owners and administrators but also to provide to the
government the names of those who contribute or post on the platform or website and the content of those posts.
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The regime can arrest and detain anyone who deliberately fails to comply with these requirements.153 These
laws empower the state to compel compliance from telecommunications providers in order to gather information
on individuals, and then to punish individuals for what they say and who they associate with.
The human rights violations facilitated by broad grants of substantive authority are further compounded by due
process and fair trial failures. For example, as part of the new Anti-Cybercrime Law (2018), Syria appointed 58
new judges to oversee special courts charged with public prosecutions and enforcement of cybercrime laws.154
These judges were trained by the Syrian regime in “filtering online content, especially on social media, and
collecting data stored on computers, information systems or storage devices to vindicate cases.”155 Human rights
experts raised concerns about the independence of these newly created courts and the continuing targeting and
detention of individuals engaged in speech online.
As widely reported, the Assad regime “detained without access to fair public trial tens of thousands of individuals,
including those associated with NGOs, human rights activists, journalists, relief workers, religious figures and
medical providers.”156 There is a lack of an independent judiciary and rampant due process violations.157 The
Human Rights Council stated that:
While the Syrian Constitution provides due process guarantees and outlaws arbitrary detention, the
Syrian criminal justice system, which encompasses civilian courts, the Counter terrorism Court, military
and field courts, is systemically failing to uphold international human rights standards at every step of the
judicial process…The judiciary fails to conduct oversight of the national justice system and provides no
effective remedy for victims of violations attributable to the State, with individuals not daring to challenge
abuses for fear of retribution.158
Dissidents and human rights defenders have been arrested and lost in the state’s jails and detention centers,
unable to access a lawyer or to have their day in court.159 According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights
from the start of the conflict in 2011 to August 2020, there have been 130,758 arbitrary arrests and 84,371 forced
disappearances carried out by the regime.160 When cases are finally assigned to a court, that assignment occurs
in “an apparently arbitrary manner to Counterterrorism Court (CTC), courts-martial, or criminal courts.”161 Once
individuals are brought before the courts, both “[m]ilitary and civilian courts consistently failed to order
investigations into cases where detainees appeared before a judge were visibly illtreated, sometimes displaying
severe injuries, and in cases of deaths in custody.”162 Military intelligence memo’s found by the nonprofit
organization, Commission for International Justice and Accountability, revealed measures taken by intelligence
leadership to shield officers involved in torture and extrajudicial killings from prosecution, outlining steps to
ensure “judicial immunity.”163
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The laws and the legal system broadly enabled and empowered the regime to take whatever measures it deemed
necessary in the name of self-preservation. Lacking an independent judiciary, the regime has been able to
establish systems of mass surveillance and an infrastructure of intimidation and violence with no fear of oversight
or exposure.

B. Access Shutdowns, Censorship and Self-Censorship
The extent of government control over internet infrastructure empowers the state to shutdown internet access
during critical periods in specific locations and to filter and remove content the authorities deem critical of the
regime. Websites and certain platforms have been used by human rights defenders, protestors, and those critical
of the Assad regime to share information and opinions, organize and mobilize the opposition, to document human
rights abuses and to publicize the reality on the ground. Unsurprisingly, these sites and specific messages were
blocked by the regime. Areas controlled by the regime have seen internet shutdowns and slowdowns, targeted
censorship and filtering of information online, and censorship of mobile communications. The level of monitoring
and censorship has in turn led to significant levels of self-censorship by individuals too afraid to express an
opinion and journalists afraid to report the news. Such interference with the peoples’ ability to speak and to
receive information, to organize and to commiserate, violates the rights to freedom of expression and of
participation in public affairs. Given the targeting of critics and those involved in opposing the regime or holding
it to account, that interference has especially impacted human rights defenders and journalists working in the
country.
The state-owned STE and private ISPs have shut down the internet in response to unrest, planned protests or
in support of kinetic operations.164 In the immediate aftermath of the 2011 uprising, the Syrian regime shut down
all access to the internet in eastern Syria.165 Localized blackouts were reported in the aftermath of the uprising,166
and continued throughout the conflict.167 Reports suggest that the Syrian regime decreased internet speeds and
entirely shut off 3G services prior to besieging an area during the Civil War. 168 During this time, activists and
authorities in Syria told the Associated Press that cell phone networks and landlines were unavailable in parts of
the capital.169 Further, the regime has “cut phone lines and Internet access in areas where regime forces [were]
conducting major military operations”.170
These practices have continued. According to the State Department 2019 Human Rights Report “regime officials
obstructed connectivity through their control of key infrastructure, at times shutting down the internet and mobile
telephone networks entirely or at particular sites of unrest.”171 Removing access to the internet and the mobile
telephone networks cuts off peoples’ access to information and silences them, frustrating their ability to speak
and to communicate and organize with others.172 Lacking such access can lead to even more severe
consequences when information is needed to seek safety or to help individuals on the ground to access lifesaving
164
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medical care or services. Along with shutdowns, the regime has blocked the websites of critics and human rights
organizations including the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and the Syrian Human Rights Committee.173
The government has also engaged in more targeted censorship, filtering text messages in connection with
planning of protests and individual posts and articles critical of the government. According to one report, special
intelligence unit named Branch 225 ordered telephone providers Syriatel and MTN Syria to block text messages
that contained words indicating planning or participation in a protest, words included “revolution” and
“demonstration.”174 Similar targeted censorship removed specific social media posts, articles and blogs critical
of the regime. For example, in a 2019 report, Freedom House reported on a journalist who was instructed by the
security services to remove a Facebook post on living conditions in Syria and an activist who was made to unlike
a Facebook post by the security services.175 According to logs accessed by a hacktivist group mapping the Syrian
regime’s use of surveillance and censorship, social-networking and video-sharing websites were especially
targeted by the government, as were websites and blogs covering the uprising.176
The censorship and monitoring of individuals’ social media posts and articles has led many to stay quiet for fear
of retaliation. The serious risk of torture and death, as documented in the section below, means many will selfcensor. 177 One student interviewed by researchers, Ahmad,178 a Syrian student attending university in 2011
spoke about how he changed his behavior due to fears of government surveillance. Ahmad was not a regime
supporter and attended peaceful protests after the revolution.179 Ahmad and his friends suspected that their
social media accounts were being monitored by the university’s Student Union, which was a state sponsored
organization with staff members appointed by the regime.180 He suspected that the Student Union office was
monitoring him and his friends because they were called into the Student Union Office and was shown pictures
of himself [Ahmad] and his friends’ social media pages.181Although Ahmad was not arrested for his posts, this
caused him to take more steps to ensure that his accounts were private and to self-monitor what he was posting
online.182 Ahmad’s fear of retaliation and of persecution was shared by many student protesters and others who
through in-person activism or social media posts shared anti-regime views.
Fear of retaliation has led to self-censorship by news organizations and NGOs, as well as individuals. The news
site Damascus Now had its offices raided and its director arrested in December of 2018 for publishing pieces
the regime deemed critical. After the raid the site stopped publishing for several weeks and when it resumed
publishing, it declined to publish anything on the arrest or the raid.183 The new leadership received the message,
‘report on anything that casts the regime in a negative light, and you too can be arrested and worse.’ Reports
from bloggers, journalists and human rights defenders indicate self-censorship has become a significant barrier
to freedom of expression, sharing of information and publication of documented human rights violations.
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C. Hacking, Tracking, and Monitoring
Removal of information and censorship are not the only tools deployed by the regime to surveille and control the
population. The regime, with support from affiliated third-party hacking groups, has limited the Syrian peoples’
ability to employ tools that facilitate anonymous communication while deploying hacking and tracking techniques
to identify and monitor critics and human rights defenders. The combination of these strategies ensures a
complete lack of privacy and provides the state with the information it needs to intimidate and silence.
Unsurprisingly, these tools have been used as part of a broader campaign of violence, in the arrest, detention,
and torture of human rights defenders.
Virtual Private Network (VPN) services are regularly used by internet users globally to safely connect to the
internet. VPN services allow users to safeguard their privacy and anonymity online while also circumventing
geographic based blocking and censorship. Because an internet user’s personal information, browsing history,
IP address and more can be tracked, particularly where the telecommunications infrastructure is government
owned and managed, VPNs provide individuals means of safeguarding their privacy. The Syrian regime,
however, blocks software and tools that allow internet users to communicate anonymously. Because the state
controls the internet infrastructure, the government is able to use “deep packet inspection (DPI) filtering on the
Syrian network, authorities were able to block secure communications tools such as OpenVPN, Later 2
Tunneling Protocol (L2TP), and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec).”184 In fact, because government forces know
people will need the tools to maintain anonymity on the internet “authorities have developed fake Skype
encryption tools and a fake VPN application, both containing harmful Trojans” to infiltrate and surveille those
seeking privacy.185 Without VPNs, internet users are vulnerable to state and non-state surveillance.
This vulnerability is further exploited through aggressive strategies deployed by, among others, state affiliated
hacking groups targeting regime critics. SEA, for example, sent links and fake software updates to install malware
and gain access to devices and accounts of activists and human rights defenders.186 Malicious software, or
malware, “refers to software code designed to be harmful to the software user, often by breaking down protective
security measures and giving access or control to unintended third parties.”187 Malware can “enable wiretapping,
turn on cameras, or physically track someone.”188 According to reports, the SEA developed malware called
SilverHawk built into Microsoft Word and YouTube fakes as well as fake updates for WhatsApp and Telegram
to hack devices.189 Once downloaded, the malware gives the SEA access to the users’ device, opening up the
users’ content, location, and history.
SEA also began using fake profiles in conjunction with phishing and spear phishing techniques in order to target
anti-regime activists on Facebook and Skype.190 SEA targeted organizers or individuals connected to anti-Assad
activities through fake profiles, often posing as women sympathetic to the cause. SEA were able to persuade
the target to disclose sensitive information such as: meeting locations, whether anti-Assad groups were armed,
and the identities of other people engaged in anti-Assad activism.191 The SEA also deployed malware through
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Facebook and other forms of messaging services by sharing videos in support of anti-Assad groups.192 By
clicking these links, malware capable of reading file contents of the phone or computer would be installed on the
individual’s device.193 Trojans such as Darkcoment and Xtreme, “[act] as remote action tools capable of capturing
webcam activity, monitoring keystrokes, and stealing passwords.”194 The monitoring and hacking of devices are
suspected to inform kinetic operations that have cost the lives of many and undermined the crucial work being
done by doctors and human rights defenders.
Monitoring and hacking leads officials to dissidents, and in turn, dissidents lead officials to others in their
networks. For example, a man in his 20s living in Syria said that the police demanded his Facebook password
in April of 2011 after arresting him at his workplace and taking his laptop. 195 The unnamed man recalled his
encounter with the Syrian police: “I told him, at first, I didn’t have a Facebook account, but he told me, after he
punched me in the face, that he knew I had one because they were watching my ‘bad comments’ on it;” which
led him to conclude they were monitoring him.196 Detentions and arrests of identified dissidents have been used
to compel disclosure of online passwords for social media and other accounts leading to further monitoring and
pursuit of networks of activists and human rights defenders.197
Such hacking and tracking techniques have been used against doctors and human rights defenders working to
minimize the harm and destruction visited on the Syrian people. In 2016, an Aleppo hospital was bombed by
suspected Russian warplanes, killing two patients.198 The hospital was bombed after David Nott, a British
surgeon and human rights defender, provided remote instructions via Skype and WhatsApp to assist doctors in
performing surgery in the underground hospital.199 Nott’s instructions were broadcast on BBC days after
providing the surgeons with remote instructions.200 Nott believes that the timing of the attack—weeks after
providing surgeons with remote instructions—and the precise nature of the bombing show that “the target could
only have been gleaned from the coordinates on his computer.”201 Nott believes that the deadly bombing
occurred because someone who saw the televised events targeted his computer and gained access to the data
identifying those he had been in contact with in Syria.202 While some experts believe Nott’s theory is credible,203
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others are hesitant to establish a correlation.204 After the hospital bombing, Nott has stated he will no longer
provide lifesaving instructions to surgeons over the internet, in Syria or elsewhere.205

D. Detention, Torture, and Executions
Monitoring, tracing networks of activists and human rights defenders, and hacking devices, not only violates the
privacy and expression rights of the Syrian people, it also forms a crucial part of an apparatus of systematic and
widespread violence. The Syrian regime has continually punished human rights defenders for their work in
documenting human rights abuses, protecting the human rights of the people, and speaking out against the
regime’s repressive practices. As has been widely reported and documented, the Syrian regime inflicts torture
and forcibly disappears persons that it deems “revolutionary” or anti-regime.206 According to a Human Rights
Council Report and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic , “[t]ens of
thousands of individuals in official and makeshift detention centers” are held, tortured, and “subsist in severely
inhumane conditions.”207 The “whereabouts of tens of thousands of detainees remain unknown and
unacknowledged by the state.”208 Some of the torture methods have included severe beating, kicking to the head
and vital organs, mutilation of genitals, malnutrition to the point of emaciation, gastro-intestinal illnesses, and
long term exposure to cold weather.209 Long months of torture are compounded by terrible inhumane detention
conditions and lack of medical assistance.210 Many detainees who were later identified by family members were
almost unidentifiable due to their emaciated and unrecognizable bodies.211 Many torture victims suffered for long
periods of time, sometimes months, before dying in detention.212
Surveillance capabilities facilitate the identification, location, and arrest of dissidents. Once in the regime’s
clutches, individuals are detained and subjected to inhumane treatment and conditions. Akram Raslan, a
cartoonist who worked for the Hama-based newspaper Al-Fedaa and contributed to several other news websites
was targeted and arrested for his work.213 In 2012, intelligence officials arrested him at his workplace in Hama
for publishing cartoons that “offended the state’s prestige.”214 For two years, nobody knew where he was, he
disappeared into the state’s network of jails and detention sites with no contact with his family or an attorney.
Then in 2015 it was reported that Raslan had been tortured to death in 2013.215
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In 2012, an anti-Assad activist and human rights defender, Bassel Khartabil, was targeted and arrested. 216
Khartabil recorded videos of events happening in Syria and sent the recordings to outside news agencies. 217
The Syrian security forces raided Khartabil’s office. In the summer of 2017, Khartabil’s fiancé announced that he
had been executed in 2015—without a trial— after three years of interrogation, torture, and imprisonment.218
Prior to his arrest, execution, and torture, Khartabil was working on establishing a surveillance free internet in
Syria and extending online access to the Syrian people.219
The scale of the state apparatus of torture is immense and substantiated by countless accounts from detainees
and their families as well as documentary evidence.220 Accounts of brutal torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment paint a vivid picture of what awaits those the regime deems a threat. Muhannad Ghabbash,
an anti-regime protester and law student from Aleppo who organized peaceful protests, was targeted and
detained by the regime for daring to speak up. 221 He was tortured for twelve days straight, hung by his wrists for
hours, beaten until he was bloody, and shocked with electricity. The torture continued until he wrote a forced
confession.222 After he wrote the confession, he was transferred to a prison in the Mezze air base in Damascus,
where the torture continued.223 He was shackled to a fence naked and sprayed with water, brutalized and
degraded by his guards and witnessed the beatings and deaths of many around him.
The Syrian regime has carried out a systematic practice of torture and ill treatment in detention through arbitrary
arrests, forced disappearances, and summary executions. The regime’s tracking of human rights defenders has
supported a campaign of terror where human rights defenders have been punished and paid the ultimate price.224

E.

Corporate Involvement

The Assad regime’s and affiliated groups’ campaign of surveillance has been facilitated by an infrastructure and
capabilities built on technologies and platforms created by foreign and multinational companies. From the U.S.
cybersecurity company Blue Coat (now Symantec), to the Italian company Area SpA, South African MTN, and
Facebook, these companies’ technologies and processes have facilitated censorship, surveillance, and
ultimately detention of activists, journalists and human rights defenders.225
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Rachel Rose O’Leary, Murder, Censorship and Syria: Crypto and the Future of Uprisings, CoinDesk (Apr. 29, 2019), available at:
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All businesses have the responsibility to engage in practices that protect human rights and ensure that States
are not using their technologies, resources, and infrastructure to perpetuate human rights abuses. 226 It is
especially important for internet companies to facilitate truthful and accessible information to create “a world
where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced
into silence or conformity.”227 Prioritizing the protection of human rights is especially important because states
are increasingly targeting online content.228 Businesses have become entangled with State violations in different
ways. Companies have provided technology, devices or software directly to the regime knowing what the regime
is doing. Some companies are regulated or asked by the state to filter content or deliver malware. Corporate
procedures have also been manipulated to advance regime goals. In each circumstance, corporate entities have
the obligation to exercise due diligence and examine their business practices, supply chains, and processes to
minimize human rights violations tied to their products and services. In 2011, the U.N Human Rights Council
endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which established key global standards for
businesses for the protection of human rights.229 Principle 13 charges business enterprises with the responsibility
of “[seeking] to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impact that are directly linked to their operations,
products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.”230
Appropriate action on the part of business enterprises to prevent and remedy human rights violations can vary
depending on the circumstances but corporations have the responsibility to exercise due diligence and to alter
their practices to mitigate harm.231
Syria’s mass digital surveillance technology was built from 2007 to 2011, and expanded and reinforced
thereafter.232 Some of the filtering devices discussed above, that enable the regime to inspect encrypted and
secured data, were manufactured by a U.S. company called Blue Coat, based out of California.233 According to
multiple reports, Blue Coat technology was used by the Syrian regime to log the activity and content of thousands
of users, from “the sites they attempted to visit and every word of their communications with the IP addresses
that pointed directly to their homes.”234 Blue coat sold 14 devices to an intermediary in Dubai that then sold 13
of the devices to Area SpA, an Italian company. These devices were then provided to the Syrian regime for
surveillance and filtering purposes.235
Syria has two dominant mobile phone provides, one owned by the cousin of President al-Assad and the other,
a subsidiary of MTN, a South African company.236 As discussed above, MTN Syria was ordered by Branch 225,
a special government intelligence unit, to block certain text messages during planned protests to interfere with
organizers’ and individuals’ ability to coordinate and organize a protest. MTN implemented the order and blocked
messages of its users.237
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There are also reports that Assad regime associated groups and supporters have used Facebook’s Community
Standards to target and remove pages that document human rights abuses in the country.238 According to a
report by the Atlantic, the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) has “publicly gloated” about the tactic of reporting their
rivals to Facebook.239 Since 2012, Facebook has regularly deleted the accounts of those documenting human
rights abuses in Syria and critics and dissidents working to organize and oppose the regime.240 In June of 2020,
Facebook deleted 10,000 Facebook accounts belonging to regime opposition activist and political opponents.241
The words: “Free Army” and “Abdel Bassel al-Sarout” in any post now violate Facebook rules, which results in
the deletion of many anti-regime activist accounts. Facebook employs content moderators to address complaints
but lacks sufficient number of moderators fluent in Arabic and its dialects. As a result, automated filters and
moderators ill equipped to review the content become easy targets for SEA strategies. The ultimate effect of
Facebook’s enforcement of their Community Standards is the silencing of regime opponents.
As the Syrian regime continues to exercise its violent power over the Syrian people, the international community
must commit to protecting the Syrian people and human rights defenders by holding global companies
accountable for their role in helping facilitate violations of human rights. Exercising human rights due diligence
is key for ensuring better corporate practices. Principle 17 of the UN Guiding Principles calls on business
enterprises to develop processes that include “assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating
and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed.”242 The
international community must prioritize the protection of human rights defenders and hold corporations and
States responsible for human rights abuses in Syria.

IV.

Conclusion

Online and mobile communications have become ubiquitous for self-expression, sharing of information and
ideas, and for publicizing human rights violations to the global community. The threat to that access and
consequences for speaking up against the state are especially severe where the government exercises broad
and unchecked power over telecommunications systems and the security of the people. The Assad regime
developed an infrastructure of surveillance that has allowed the regime to exercise control over internet access
and use, monitoring and filtering expressions that challenge or criticize the state. The regime has hacked and
tracked critics and human rights defenders, deploying sophisticated and coordinated strategies for identifying
dissidents and speech it finds a threat. This system of surveillance is part of a larger campaign of silencing and
persecution. The human rights of the Syrian people have been and continue to be violated. The right to privacy,
the freedom of expression and of participation, the right to life and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and
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degrading treatment and the right to seek a remedy are being systematically violated by a regime bent on control
and domination.
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